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Source Credibility and Cybersecurity Behaviors
Bracken Sallin
Department of Computer Science
Abstract – In an increasingly interdependent society
characterized by omnipresent online communications,
Information Systems security research is an important
contributor in helping protect people and
organizations from cyber-attacks. Cyber-attacks are
increasing in their number and scope. In May 2017 a
series of ransomware attacks affected hundreds of
thousands of computers across the globe, causing
significant loss of business. Understanding how
people interact with IT threats is an integral step to
cyber-security. In this paper, I modify and extend the
model developed by Liang and Xue in their
Technology Threat Avoidance Theory to evaluate the
effects of source credibility on computer user’s
behaviors.

I. Introduction
Cybersecurity is an umbrella term that relates
both the technological and human domain. Because of
this it is crucial to examine the extent of the impact the
two have on each-other. To understand this connection
it is important to examine the role of human behavior
in cybersecurity attacks. Most victims’ computers
were not updated, or were running outdated software.
Organizations may have standing policies in place
dictating IT behaviors or systems, but so long as
people do not act on these protocols, security
vulnerabilities will persist.
It is this vulnerable element that IT security
and information assurance literature seeks to
understand. While the technical infrastructures
underlying security issues are generally well
understood, less well developed is research on the role
human behavior and communications play in

Cybersecurity (Zafar and Clark, 2009). The most
significant development in recent decades is the
ubiquity of the internet and its impact on
communications and society in general. Internet
communication is increasingly characterized by the
pervasive use of social media throughout the world.
Social media like Facebook, Twitter,
YouTube, Instagram, and other platforms, influence
the way people communicate and interact with each
other, exchange ideas, and support causes and
campaigns (Siemans 2005). Communication in social
media is of particular interest in marketing research,
which has examined how consumers and brands
interact with each-other. Social media communication
is interesting in that studies have found that online
communications (electronic word of mouth) differ
from standard word of mouth communications. This
distinction has important implications in IS research,
and was a critical component as we constructed our
research model.

II. Background and Related Work
In developing a Technology and Source
Credibility model we considered the role social media
might play in impacting Cybersecurity knowledge
transfer, and how the characteristics of social media
and social media networks enable this (Gupta, J;
Patnayakuni, N; Patnayakuni, R., 2017). To approach
this and build constructs for our model, we draw from
two behavioral models from prior research: the
Technology Threat Avoidance Theory – TTAT, and
the Elaboration Likelihood Model – ELM. (Liang and
Xue 2009; Cacioppo, Petty 1986).
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Figure 1: Conceptual Model: (Gupta, J; Patnayakuni, N; Patnayakuni, R., 2017)
The TTAT model explains how individual
users avoid IT threats in voluntary settings (Liang and
Xue, 2009). Liang and Xue (2009) argue that security
behaviors users engage in are a two part process that
distinguishes threat appraisal from coping appraisal.
Further, the TTAT posits that users are influenced by
different mechanisms in each process. Threat appraisal
is distinguished from coping appraisal based on the
discrepancy between the two states. That is, the
difference between the two is the dissonance created
by an acknowledged threat and the impact it could
have on the user. These distinctions are defined as
driving individual attitudes and behaviors towards IT
threats.
In identifying this difference, Liang and Xue
(2009) developed a model using eight constructs:
perceived severity, perceived susceptibility, perceived
threat, safeguard effectiveness, safeguard cost, selfefficacy, avoidance motivation, and avoidance
behavior. Liang and Xue (2009) hypothesized the
relationships between these constructs in their model,
and the empirical support they found for their model is
the principle reason why we adopt the TTAT model
for this summer’s research.
We extend the TTAT model of the threat
appraisal process by adopting concepts from the
Elaboration Likelihood Model into our Source
Credibility model. The ELM is of interest to us in how
it examines the influence of source credibility in the
context of different communication types. The ELM
examines cognitive processing based on how
individuals respond to persuasive messages
(Cacioppo, Petty 1986).
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Considering
the
important
role
communication plays in influencing behavior we
propose that people evaluate cybersecurity
information differently in the online context than
traditional news media when making appraisals of
individual vulnerability. We propose that this can be
evaluated using constructs adopted from the TTAT
and ELM, and examined in the context of source
credibility.
We define source credibility as the functional
image of the source in the minds of the receivers.
Studies demonstrate a strong correlation between
source credibility and behavioral influence in standard
communication transactions (Dholakia & Sternthal,
1977; Bansal & Voyer, 2000). As behaviors are the
primary drivers behind responses to perceived threats,
we adopt the TTAT’s model for our evaluative
purposes.

III. Method
To test the hypothesis a questionnaire was
developed that evaluated the characteristic behaviors
of individuals when confronted with cybersecurity
information. To distribute our questionnaire we used
the online survey tool Qualtrics. Our survey was
disseminated through email to all the students in the
College of Business. We sent out 1223 emails, of
which 489 were opened. From the opened emails we
had 164 respondents. For the purposes of a pilot study,
this 34% response rate was acceptable. The overall
response rate of all respondents contacted, 13.4%, is
also very respectable.
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In the survey, two cybersecurity scenarios
were created. One scenario identified the source of
cybersecurity threat information as standard news
media information. The other identified the source of
cybersecurity threat information as social media for
the same IT threat. To measure users’ responses to our
constructs, we used a modified Likert scale, as well as
a personal inventory metric.
The first scenario we presented users with is
as follows:
“You receive the following news update from
print media (for example The Wall Street
Journal) or News and Cable news networks
(for example NBC):
Malicious software known as ransomware
has been making headlines after hackers
hijacked hundreds of thousands of computer
worldwide. Ransomware locks up user’s
data and threatens to permanently delete the
data if a ransom is not paid. The global
impact has been across more than 150
countries across America, Europe and Asia.
You have also heard that at least 66
computers on the UAH campus have been
affected by the attack.”
The second scenario we presented users with
is as follows:
“You receive a post from a member of your
social media circle on one of your social
media channels (for example Facebook):
Massive ransomware attack! One of my
friend’s computers has been infected! She
can’t access her data! Pass on the information
to everybody you know and ask them to be
careful out there.
Go to this site
http://clover.vessel.com/wash/r3c5/mal.aspx
to learn how to protect your computer.
You have also heard that at least 66
computers on UAH campus have been
affected by the attack.”
This questionnaire had constructs adopted
from Liang and Xue’s (2009) Technology Threat
Avoidance Theory and the Elaboration Likelihood

Model.
These
constructs
were:
perceived
susceptibility, perceived severity, perceived threat,
avoidance motivation, avoidance behavior, perceived
safeguard cost, and perceived safeguard effectiveness.
In addition to this, we designed constructs measuring
self-efficacy, issue involvement, and source
credibility.
Our first three constructs were perceived
susceptibility, perceived severity, and perceived
threat. In our study we defined perceived susceptibility
as an individual’s subjective probability that a
malicious IT would affect him or her. Put in the
context of each scenario, we attempted to identify the
strength of response to an itemized list of questions
concerning this definition and how likely the
individual felt they would be exposed to an IT threat.
Related to the construct of perceived
susceptibility is the construct of perceived severity,
which is defined as how an individual perceives the
negative consequences of an IT threat. We measured
this by a series of questions which examined how users
felt about loss of personal information, property, or
financial assets. Finally, we defined our perceived
threat construct as the extent to which an individual
perceived a malicious IT as dangerous or harmful. We
asked people how they felt the likelihood they would
be affected by the IT threat was based on the scenario
they were given.
In addition to these we had three constructs
measuring users’ perception of safeguard measures
and personal competence. In the context of these, they
were: perceived safeguard effectiveness, self-efficacy,
and perceived safeguard cost. We defined perceived
safeguard effectiveness as an individual’s subjective
assessment of how effectively a given safeguard
measure – such as spam filters, anti-virus, windows
updating, is against a given IT threat.
With safeguard effectiveness we also
designed a construct that attempted to measure a user’s
self-efficacy, or confidence in enacting these
safeguard measures against IT threats. Finally, we
designed a construct to measure safeguard cost. We
defined safeguard cost as the physical and cognitive
efforts required by an individual to use safeguard
measures. Our intention was to evaluate individual
perceptions of investment in dealing with IT threats.
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The final constructs we adopted from the
TTAT for our model were avoidance motivation and
avoidance behavior. Avoidance motivation is defined
as the degree to which IT users are motivated to avoid
IT threats by taking safeguard measures. We asked
survey participants if the scenario they were given
influenced their security behaviors. These security
behaviors are captured in the avoidance behavior
construct, which is defined as the extent to which
individual motivation influences action against IT
threats.
Last, we created a construct measuring users’
issue involvement. We adopted this construct from
McQuarrie and Munson’s (1987) personal
involvement inventory, and defined it as the extent
with which an individual user is engaged with
cybersecurity. In designing this, we hoped that a
strong involvement would correlate to a higher net
avoidance motivation and behavior.
In addition to collecting data on these
constructs, we collected general demographic
information on survey respondents. This data
included: gender, class standing, major, number of
credit hours taken each semester, computer and
internet usage, and educational experience of parents.

IV. Results and Analysis
A series of statistical analyses were
performed on our data. Using Excel, R, and SPSS we
examined our data using a variety of statistical
techniques, and for the purpose of this paper relied
primarily on correlation analysis. We summarized our
most important findings by their r values. Our findings
are represented by the following correlation matrix. In
the matrix the r value for each construct is given in
relation to another construct.

R values denote the strength and direction of
correlation between two variables in a linear
relationship. While accepted or expected r levels vary
by discipline and topic, studies like ours report a
strong relationship for values of .7 or higher, and a
moderate relationship of .5 or higher. The high r values
displayed in our correlation matrix signify a need for
more investigation on our model and research in this
area.
In our data we found that source credibility
was not found to have any noticeable effect on our
model’s constructs (no statistically significant r value
above .157), but other worthwhile findings emerged
(Figure 1). Not only did each scenario test differently,
but pronounced relationships were found between
several of our constructs.
First, we found a strong correlation of .808
between perceived susceptibility and perceived threat.
We also found a suggestive r value of .564 between
our self-efficacy and avoidance behavior constructs
and an r value of .526 between our self-efficacy and
avoidance motivation constructs. Furthermore, we
found a strong positive correlation between avoidance
motivation and avoidance behavior of .77. Finally,
indicative r values of .553 and .459 were found
between our issue involvement, avoidance behavior
and avoidance motivation constructs. Taken together,
these r values suggest a moderate to strong positive
correlation between the mentioned constructs (Figure
1).
Other interesting relationships also emerged
from the correlation matrix. The perceived severity
and perceived susceptibility constructs had an r value
of .384. As well, perceived severity and perceived
threat had an r value of .375 (Figure 1). Though these
have no effect on our hypothesis, these lower values
may provide interesting avenues for future exploration
and research.

Figure 2: Correlation Matrix
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V. Conclusion
Future models for research like this should
more strongly distinguish the constructs between
individual scenarios. Due to significant time
constraints it was impossible to design, test, refine, and
analyze data from our model in a desired fashion.
Different and more thorough statistical analyses might
provide more revealing information about our data
sets. Second, our survey was constrained to a small
population of business students at the University of
Alabama in Huntsville. As such, it is possible our
results are not representative of a wider demographic.
Differences we noted in scenario treatments might be
more pronounced, or more suggestive provided a
larger and more diverse sample set. Finally, it is
possible our treatment of our individual constructs

and women across our issue involvement constructs is
listed. Each data point shows the disparity of responses
between men and women.
This data may provide useful avenues of
research in the future. Currently, there is a paucity of
IT literature on gender involvement in cybersecurity.
If our sample data is representative of the larger
population, understanding why this disparity exists,
and what mechanisms underlie it could prove useful in
constructing cybersecurity responses to threats that
considers both men and women’s engagement.
Cybersecurity is a cybernetic process. It
should consider both the hardware capital and human
resources available. In the future, creating a secure
environment in which governments, businesses, and

Figure 3: Gender Differences in Cybersecurity Responses
could be adjusted to make user evaluation of source
credibility in response to each scenario more
meaningful or personal.
In spite of the data not immediately
supporting our source credibility model, some
meaningful observations emerge from the larger dataset in the context of demographic information
collected. For example, an analysis of the constructs
between genders shows that each scenario was treated
differently. Further, a significant difference exists
across the strength of IT engagement between genders.
Women were found to be less involved and confident
in enacting safeguard measures for IT threats. In the
following chart the mean score of responses for men

individuals interact will require research in both the
computer and behavioral sciences. No matter how
efficient or failsafe a technical infrastructure is, human
behavior will remain an integral part of IT security.
Current consumer research – such as the use of big
data in targeting customers, may be useful to
businesses and organizations in understanding the IT
behaviors of its employees or constituents. A
successful IT infrastructure in the future may
constitute of individual training armed by data in
addition to anti-virus software, spam filters, and
firewalls.
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